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Abstract 
For years, attack graphs have been an important tool for security assessment 
of enterprise networks, but IoT devices, a new player in the IT world, might 
threat the reliability of this tool. In this paper, we review the challenges that 
must be addressed when using attack graphs to model and analyze enterprise 
networks that include IoT devices. In addition, we propose novel ideas and 
countermeasures aimed at addressing these challenges.  
 
1  Introduction  
The adoption of Internet of Things (IoT) technology and integration of IoT devices into the 
networks of enterprise organizations has increased dramatically worldwide [1]. Unfortunately, 
many IoT devices manufacturers focus on novel functionalities and short time -to-market, 
while ignoring the security and privacy risks [2]. As a result, these IoT devices are deployed 
with a variety of unresolved vulnerabilities that may be exploited by attackers and thus 
introduce new risks to the organizations.  
Traditional security and IT management tools used in enterprise organizations were primarily 
designed for networks with static hosts (e.g., servers and PCs). The special features and 
characteristics of IoT devices have been overlooked, and therefore, existing security tools and 
methods do not address them. Although scanning for vulnerable IoT devices can be performed 
with various scanning tools [3], they might be less effective for IoT devices in larger 
enterprises networks (e.g., in this setting they might be unable to identify the devices or 
vulnerabilities within a reasonable amount of time or supply partial output).  
IoT devices introduce new challenges in terms of cyber security. First, the diversity of the 
communication medium and protocols used by IoT devices, especially short -range 
communication like Bluetooth or ZigBee, might open an unmonitored attack vector for IoT 
devices. As has been demonstrated, a compromised smart lamp could infect similar devices 
via physical proximity (via ZigBee protocol) and render network isolation useless  [4]. In 
addition, the mobility of some IoT devices and the dynamic changes in network topology 
caused by the devices, impair the development of efficient security solutions  [5]. Moreover, 
IoT devices affect each other in different ways, both explicitly (an application that uses 
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multiple devices) and implicitly (a smart light bulb could trigger a smart light sensor). 
Therefore, there is a need to address the new security challenges posed by IoT devices by 
adapting existing security assessment methodologies and remedies.  
In this paper, we review the security assessment challenges in enterprise networks containing 
IoT devices. Specifically, we focus on attack graphs as an important tool for security 
assessment that needs to be adapted to the new reality of IoT technology. We discuss the gaps 
and limitations of the existing security assessment methodologies relying on attack graphs. To 
the best of our knowledge, existing research on attack graphs does not consider the unique 
behavior of IoT devices and may fail to deliver reliable results in enterprise environments that 
contain IoT devices.  
This paper lists issues that must be considered when employing attack graphs to model and 
analyze networks that include IoT devices, and presents possible ways of resolving these 
issues. Specifically, we discuss an IoT scanner tailored to collect data specific to IoT devices  
[6]. We further propose a novel idea for adjusting attack graphs to address the challenges 
related to the mobility of IoT devices and dynamic network changes. Finally, we demonstrate 
an application of the adjusted attack graphs to determine the deployment of a set of IoT devices 
which minimizes the security risk to the organization, and map directions for future research.  
We believe that this work will help organizations and researchers better understand the unique 
challenges and key limitations of performing attack graph analysis in the presence of IoT 
devices. Furthermore, we provide a concise list of changes that must be made in order to enab le 
attack graph analysis on such networks.  
 
2  Background on Attack Graphs  
An attack graph is a model of a computer network that encompasses computer connectivity, 
vulnerabilities, assets, and exploits. Attack graphs are used to represent collections of comple x 
multi-step attack scenarios which traverse an organization from an initial entry point to the 
most critical assets. By analyzing the attack graph, a security analyst can assess the risks of 
potential intrusions and devise effective protective strategies. The attack graph analysis 
methodology contains three main stages:   
 Network and vulnerability scanning.  
 Attack graph modeling. 
 Attack graph analysis. 
 
2 .1   Netw o rk a nd  Vulnera b i l i t y  Sca nning  
Most attack graphs rely on computer network configuration, such as the network topology, 
firewall configuration, operating systems, open services, etc. [7] Therefore, different tools and 
databases are used to improve the scanning and mapping process. For instance, Nessus [8] and 
OpenVAS [9] are vulnerability scanners commonly used to map the systems, services, and 
vulnerabilities within an organization. Vulnerability databases, such as the National 
Vulnerability Database (NVD) [10] and the Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) 
[11], also contain additional information about the vulnerabilities (attack complexity, required 
privileges, exploit severity, etc.) used to augment an attack graph. 
Vulnerability scanners are also used to assess the connectivity between different network 
segments within an organization. However, these tools do not capture connectivity between 
individual computers allowed through exceptions defined in the firewalls. Therefore, 
additional processing of firewall configurations is necessary to complement the network 
connectivity information required for accurate attack graphs.  
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Figure 1: Simple attack graph. 
 
 
2 .2   Atta ck Gra p h M o de l ing  
State-of-the-art attack graph modeling tools, such as MulVAL [12] [13] and NetSPA [14], use 
logical expressions to represent the possible attacker actions with their preconditions and 
acquired assets. Other graph-based modeling techniques, such as ADversary VIew Security 
Evaluation (ADVISE) [15] and Attack-Defense Trees (ADTrees) [16], aim to provide a useful 
security assessment solution. The IoT challenges discussed in this paper are relevant to all 
attack graph modeling techniques, but the examples provided are based on the logical attack 
graphs. 
MulVAL relies on the Datalog programming language for describing the attack graph. It 
defines three types of nodes:  
 Fact nodes, which describe the initial network condition (connectivity and 
vulnerabilities), are usually drawn as rectangles in typical visual representations of 
attack graphs (see Figure 2).  
 Exploit/action nodes (visually denoted as ovals) represent the acts of exploiting a 
vulnerability or acquiring an asset.  
 Privilege nodes (visually denoted as rhombuses) represent assets (e.g., information, 
access privileges) obtained by the attacker as a result of performing an action . 
In order to obtain a privilege (P1), an attacker must execute one of the actions (E1) leading to  
the privilege node (logical OR). To use an exploit (E1) the attacker needs all the privileges 
and facts (F1, F2, F3) that lead to the exploit (logical AND). Once executed, the exploit node 
implies all the post-conditions (privileges) it leads to.  
 
2 .3   Atta ck Gra p h Ana ly s i s  
Attack graphs are well formed planning problems, due to their logical AND-OR structure [17]. 
State-of-the-art planners can be used to determine the optimal attack plans, which in turn can 
be used to assess the probability of a successful attack, the expected cost of an atta ck, the 
assets at highest risk, etc. These are important capabilities, since patching all the 
vulnerabilities in a network is not always possible (e.g., due to budget limitations or 
operational constraints). Therefore, although scanners can help detect vulnerabilities in the 
system, they do not serve as a standalone solution for securing a network. Attack graphs can 
evaluate the system based on different configurations and determine the optimal patching or 
deployment strategy. Furthermore, they can also be used to improve intrusion detection 
systems (IDSs) by correlating alerts that correspond to exploits along feasible attack plans.  
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Figure 2: An example of an enterprise network with two IoT devices: IP camera and robotic 
vacuum cleaner. Two VLANs are defined: Regular (green) and Restricted (red). An attacker 
controls a host in the room on the left which is connected to VLAN Regular via L. 
 
 
2 .4   Kno w n Li mi ta t io ns  o f  At ta ck Gra p hs  
Two major limitations of attack graphs acknowledged in the literature are scalability and 
dynamic adjustments [18]. Attack graphs do not scale well. Networks with dozens of 
computers result in attack graphs with thousands of nodes. Furthermore, probabilistic attack 
graphs might require solving huge Markov decision process (MDP) problems which is 
infeasible even for small computer networks.  Proposed solutions attempt to reduce the size 
of the graph or split it into multiple independent problems. According to  [18], an adequate 
attack graph representation does not yet exist. Dynamic adjustment of elements in the network 
limits the use of attack graphs in dynamically changing networks. This problem is relatively 
new in the literature, and as with the above-mentioned scalability issue, an effective solution 
remains elusive. 
 
3  New Challenges Introduced by IoT Technology  
In this section, we discuss the new challenges, in each stage of the attack graph methodology, 
which must be considered and resolved when using attack graphs for modeling and analyzing 
networks with IoT devices. We will use the following scenario with two IoT devices (see 
Figure 2) to demonstrate the challenges and potential solutions throughout the paper. 
The scenario includes an enterprise network with two IoT devices: security camera and smart 
vacuum cleaner, and two VLANs: Regular with permissive security policies (green) and 
Restricted with hosts containing confidential data (red). Two wireless access points (WAP) are 
located on two sides of a corridor: left (L) and right (R). Access to the Regular network is 
provided on both sides of the corridor. Access to the Restricted network is provided only in 
the room on the right side of the corridor and requires password authentication. A host 
controlled by the attacker is located in the room on the left and is connected to VLAN Regular 
via confidential data, and although she knows the credentials for the Restricted network, she 
has no physical access to it. A smart vacuum cleaner cleans the room on the left side of th e 
corridor in the morning and the room on the right side of the corridor at night while connecting  
to the VLAN Regular, via L or R respectively. The vacuum cleaner has an unsecured Bluetooth 
capability that allows the attacker to infect the device when it is located in the left side of the 
corridor (due to physical proximity). A security camera is connected to VLAN Regular. The 
location of the camera is variously on the left or right side of the corridor and uses the close st 
WAP to access the network. Regardless of the position of the security camera, it monitors the 
whole corridor including the movements of the vacuum cleaner.  
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3 .1   Sca nning  fo r  Co nnec t iv i ty  a nd  Vulnera bi l i t i e s  
The first stage of security assessment of an organization includes mapping the network 
components, hosts, and services. Therefore, the goal of the scanning process is to collect all 
the essential data in order to derive a reliable and complete model of the organization (i.e., t he 
nodes and edges of the attack graph).  
Standard scanning tools rely on fingerprints or heuristics tailored to specific operating 
systems, services, applications and vulnerabilities. The diversity of new IoT devices, their 
services and configurations poses a serious challenge to development of efficient scanning 
tools capable of identifying IoT devices within the organizational network. Moreover, many 
IoT devices have low resources, and as a result, installation of monitoring software is not 
always possible for smart devices. Thus, scanning the network with commonly used tools 
results in only partial information, which in turn, leads to fragmentary attack graphs and 
inaccurate security risk assessment.  
Short-range communication protocols could be exploited as part of a cyber-attack aimed at 
subverting IoT devices. Scanning of the various short-range communication channels used by 
IoT devices requires technology that is not readily available in commercial  off the shelf 
scanners. Moreover, certain low power IoT devices occasionally disable their communication 
to save battery power. Therefore, it would be challenging to identify a cross-device 
communication capability of a new device if it keeps silent during the scan. Partial mitigation 
of this challenge may include mapping the physical location of each IoT device along with the 
physical locations of regular IT devices (PCs and servers). The physical proximity between 
devices may suggest the presence of a short-rang connection between the devices. This method 
is inaccurate, and scanning short-range communication needs to be addressed in a new way. 
In contrast to IoT devices which are frequently upgraded or replaced, regular I T equipment 
like PCs or servers is rarely replaced by newer equipment and is also more  stable. Smart IoT 
devices are rapidly changed rendering the results of past scans irrelevant after a short time 
period. However, the network changes that are caused by IoT devices usually result from the 
devices’ unique design. Unlike PCs and servers, mobile IoT devices change their location and 
their connection points within the organizational network. For example, the vacuum cleaner 
in Figure 2 may connect to the Regular VLAN via two different WAPs.  In addition, other  
devices capabilities can change the connectivity; an IoT device may behave differently 
according to changes in its environment that are monitored by the device's  sensors. For 
instance, a security camera may be configured to start recording and enable the streaming 
service only when movement is detected by its motion sensor; otherwise the streaming service 
port will be closed for security reasons. In order to create a comprehensive model of the 
network, the scanning process should rapidly identify changes in the IoT devices' connectivity 
and enabled services. 
 
3 .2   M o del ing  
The next stage of creating and analyzing attack graphs is attack graph modeling.  
Most attack graph models allow defining connectivity between specific defines, and therefore, 
short-range communication do not pose a serious challenge in this stage. However, it s till need 
to be addressed. The mobility capability of some IoT devices primarily affect the modeling of 
short-range wireless communication (which is based on physical proximity). Therefo re, the 
physical location of hosts need to be represented in the attack graph to improve the security 
in the face of the changes created by the new technology.  
Some IoT devices' behavior is based on information that is collected via sensors and the 
feedback from other IoT devices in the network. As a result, two identical devices may act 
completely different when placed in different areas. Moreover, those unique capabilities could 
be exploited by an attacker. For instance, the attacker can gain information by tapping a 
camera’s video stream and remotely monitoring an organization. For that reason, in addition 
to the network connectivity, the special functionalities of each IoT device in the network is 
important for security assessment.   
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Table 1: IoT security challenges and their effects on different stages of creating an attack 
graph of a network that contains IoT devices.  
 
Challenge Description IoT Attack Graph Stage 
Diversity 
It is challenging to find a general 
solution for the wide variety of 
IoT devices. Moreover, devices of 
the same type might behave 
differently. 
Identifying an IoT device, its 
connectivity, list of vulnerabilities, 
or even its type is a challenging task.  
Scanning 
Lack of 
monitoring 
IoT devices and some of the 
protocols they use are monitored 
only partially or not at all. 
Collecting information on IoT 
devices is more difficult due to the 
lack of monitoring of the unique 
device protocols. 
Scanning 
Cross device 
capabilities 
IoT devices may implicitly and 
indirectly affect other devices and 
applications. The dependencies 
between the devices are hard to 
correctly assess. 
Cross device dependencies must be 
known and represented in the attack 
graph. Therefore, the capabilities of 
each device need to be represented in 
the graph according to the current 
context of the devices in the 
network. 
Scanning, 
Modeling, 
Analysis 
Physical 
location 
Cyber-attacks might spread via 
physical proximity as well as via 
an Internet connection. 
Physical locations of hosts and 
devices need to be scanned, 
measured and modeled in the attack 
graph in order to create a reliable 
representation of short-range 
communication protocols. 
Scanning, 
Modeling 
Rapid change 
The behavior of IoT devices may 
change rapidly. Furthermore, IoT 
devices are added and replaced 
quicker than traditional hosts. 
Snapshots of a network with IoT 
devices become irrelevant quicker 
than snapshots of a network without 
such devices. 
Scanning, 
Modeling, 
Analysis 
Mobility 
Some IoT devices have the 
capability to change their location 
or connection state. 
Scanning the device's location and 
connectivity over time might lead to 
different results. Furthermore, 
temporal aspects need to be modeled 
in the attack graph. 
Scanning, 
Modeling, 
Analysis 
Device 
capabilities 
IoT devices usually have unique 
capabilities that could be 
manipulated during a cyber-
attack. Traditional monitoring 
and security tools might be 
limited when used for IoT devices 
with novel functionality and 
sensors. 
Devices’ capabilities and the effect 
of each device on the network need 
to be scanned and modeled in the 
attack graph. 
Scanning, 
Modeling, 
Analysis 
Quantity 
The number of connected IoT 
devices is increasing each year. 
The number of connected IoT 
devices affects the size and 
complexity of the scanned network 
and respective attack graph. 
Modeling, 
Analysis 
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IoT devices may change their connectivity frequently over time due to unique capabilities, and 
add temporal aspect to the network. For example, the vacuum cleaner in Figure 2 cleans 
distinct areas at different times of the day. Therefore, the attack graph must represent the 
network in the morning and at night, as well as the transition period between the two times of 
day. If the temporal aspect is not part of the attack graph, some threats might be missing from 
the graph. 
Scaling still needs to be addressed in order for large enterprises to use the attack graph 
assessment tool, and this is exacerbated when IoT technology is added to the p icture. In the 
near future, the increasing number of connected devices could cause an increase in the scale 
of every network. Therefore, it is even more important than ever to address the scaling 
challenge for attack graphs if this tool is going to continue to be relevant. 
 
3 .3   Ana ly s i s  
Finally, the attack graph of the organization’s network is analyzed using different techniques 
in order to identify threats, security holes, etc.  
In addition to modeling temporal aspect in attack graph, there are also implications on 
analyzing those aspects in the graph when IoT devices are involved. The state of each node 
might change between the temporal intervals and need to be addressed in the analysis stage. 
For instance, if the vacuum cleaner in Figure 2 gets infected in the morning by an attacker’s 
malware when cleaning the room on the left, the attack graph for the next night might look 
different from the one from the night before. The analysis process need to support the location 
changes over time, that caused by the device's mobility. Therefore, the temporal aspect should 
be considered when determining the state of each graph node as well.  
The rapid changes in the network due to the behavior, capabilities, and cross device 
capabilities of IoT devices can be challenging for an assessment tool such as an attack graph, 
which has traditionally designed for static networks. Analyzing a snapshot of a network that 
contains IoT devices may not provide a real-time solution which monitors and represents the 
network’s modifications. However, developing a real-time attack graph is not scalable and 
might create additional challenges to those presented in this paper.  
Table 1 summarizes the security challenges related to IoT devices discussed in this section, 
along with their impact on the traditional attack graphs used for security assessment.  
 
4  Adjustments  of  Attack Graphs  
In this section, we present novel ideas for future research aimed at addressing and over coming 
some of the previously mentioned challenges.  
 
4 .1   M o ni to r ing  o f  Wire le ss  Tra f f i c  
Due to the distributed and wireless character of IoT communications, traffic monitoring could 
also leverage passive observations on the wireless link layer. For example, syste ms such as 
IoTScanner [6] could be used to obtain real-time information about current network topologies 
and estimate the types of the end devices involved [19]. 
Such monitoring tools utilizes several radios for wireless standards to passively collect traffic 
in the neighborhood. All the traffic collected is then processed based on a set of rules to extract 
features for both real-time analysis (e.g., device detection, current volume of traffic) and 
analysis performed at a later time (e.g., for device classification). Network connectivity graphs 
for the different wireless standards are continuously produced as a result of the real -time 
analysis. The information could then be stored in suitable graph-based data structures and used 
to enrich the attack graph-based assessment as described in this work. Alternatively, the 
monitor could be used to detect configuration and connectivity changes, and trigger 
appropriate actions. 
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Figure 3: Example of a temporal attack graph. The colors represent the state of each node: a 
white node is “off” while a gray node is “on.” 
 
 
4 .2   Te mpo ra l  At ta ck Gra p hs  a nd  No de  Sta te  
A temporal attack graph that represents the model of a network at different times of the day 
could provide a possible solution for the dynamism of a network. The temporal attack graph 
that we present is a dynamic attack graph which represents a network in each predetermined 
temporal. For a temporal interval, the graph is based on nodes in one of two possible states: 
the ``on'' state when the node needs to appear in the graph for this interval, or the ``off'' state 
if it does not need to appear in the graph.  
In Figure 3, we demonstrate how a temporal attack graph can model two temporal intervals 
(morning and night) of the network presented in Figure 2. In the morning (left), when the 
vacuum cleaner is on the left side of the corridor, the attacker may infect the vacuum clearer 
by exploiting the physical proximity and the vulnerable Bluetooth channel.  However, the 
attacker can not use the device to connect to the Restricted VLAN since she does not have 
physical access to R. In the morning (left) this constraint is depicted by the unsatisfied 
precondition F7 of action E3 (since F7's state is “off”). As a result, there is no path that leads 
the attacker to her goal. However, at night (right), the vacuum cleaner is located on the right 
side of the corridor and is connected to the Regular VLAN via R (precondition F7's state is 
“on”). If at the same time the vacuum cleaner is infected, then the attacker is able to execute 
action E3 and eventually reach her goal.  
In addition to the constant state of the nodes in a traditional attack graph, (where the node 
always appears), the state of a node might be updated according to changes in the networks. 
A volatile behavior in the network is represented in the temporal attack graph as a change in 
the state of a node over time. For example, the vacuum cleaner ’s location in the morning turns 
“on” F1 and turns “off” F7. At night, the states change again but in the opposite direction. A 
persistent behavior in the network may change a node’s state from “off” to “on” (and vice 
versa) starting from a certain event (e.g., P1 in the morning will leave the compatible privilege 
“on”). Furthermore, the state of each node may affect the state of other nodes. For instance, if  
one of the preconditions for an action node is “off,” so is the action. 
Such temporal attack graph could be implemented in several ways. Modeling the temporal 
attack graph is based on the results of the scanning process over time and therefore, represents  
the changes in the network. However, adding the time aspect to the attack graph might increase 
its complexity, and as a result, the development of a temporal attack graph must overcome the 
scaling challenge. 
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Figure 4: Example of an attack graph for the security camera. In the upper part of the figure, 
the camera is deployed on the right side of the corridor. There is attack path from the attacker  
to the confidential data (the goal). In the lower part of the figure, the camera  is deployed on 
the left side of the corridor. There is no path for the attacker to get access to the confidenti al 
data. 
 
4 .3   Ca pa bi l i t i e s  
Each IoT device contains the sensors and functionality it needs to fulfill its task. However, 
this legitimate capability could be exploited for malicious porpoises.  
The representation of IoT devices capabilities as nodes is demonstrated in Figure 3 in node 
P1. An attacker can exploit the security camera to gain access to the video stream and learn 
the location of the smart vacuum cleaner. The capabilities of IoT devices can be represented 
in an attack graph in the same way that vulnerabilities are modeled in the traditional attack 
graph. 
However, the IoT diversity make the representation of capabilities a challenging task, since 
two devices of the same type might have different capabilities. Moreover, a certain device and 
its capabilities may be exploited in different ways when deployed in different environment. 
For example, if an attacker can monitor the video stream of a security camera, the location 
and position of the camera affects the information she can obtain information. The solution 
need to support all the types of IoT devices and model each functionality for each device in 
each possible context. 
 
5  Using Attack Graphs to Optimize Deployment of  IoT 
Devices  
In this section, we will present how an adjusted attack graph can solve the deployment 
challenge of IoT devices. 
IoT devices can be deployed in a wide range of locations, but due to security risks and great 
diversity, their deployment need to be considered twice. Careless deployment of IoT devices 
can potentially help an attacker to penetrate a network. Adjusting attack graphs to support 
networks with IoT devices, might enable the graphs to supply the solution for the deployment 
challenge. 
For example, in Figure 2 the camera’s goal is to monitor the corridor, and could be deployed 
only at the left or right side of the corridor. If the camera is located on the left side of the  
corridor, it will connect to the Regular VLAN via L, and via R vice versa. 
As presented in Figure 3, when the camera is deployed on the left side of the corridor there is 
only one path to the goal node. The attacker needs to infect the camera and vacuum cleaner in 
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the morning and gain access to the Restricted network at night (when the vacuum cleaner 
changes its location). However, deploying the camera on the right side of the corridor is not 
secure, since it creates another attack path (as shown in Figure 4). In this path, which can be 
exploited at any time of day, the attacker can acquire P2 and combine it with E8 to connect 
the camera to the Restricted network (P5). Therefore, deploying the camera on the left side of 
the corridor is a more secure choice than deploying the camera on the right side. 
Our goal is to find the optimal deployment of a set of IoT devices -- one that will minimize 
the security risk. Given a set of IoT devices and a list of constraints for each device (e.g., the 
camera must be deployed in the corridor), determining the optimal deployment can be 
accomplished by evaluating the risks to the network posed by every possible deployment. The 
main weaknesses of this approach are its time complexity and the need for reliable network 
scanning that represents the network, including the IoT devices, accurately.  
 
6  Conclusion  
In this paper, we demonstrated how IoT devices affect the security assessment of enterprise 
networks and create new challenges for state-of-the-art assessment methodologies based on 
attack graphs. We pointed out aspects that need to be addressed in each of the three main steps 
of the attack graph analysis methodology and demonstrated the challenges using a simple 
scenario. 
We believe that in order to improve the security of enterprise organizations that deploy IoT 
devices on their premises, traditional security and assessment tools need to be adapted to 
address the challenges posed by the IoT devices’ characteristics. In future work, we plan to 
implement our requirements using MulVal or another open source framework. In addition,  
we plan to investigate methods for risk assessment of IoT devices that consider a device's 
capabilities in specific contexts. Finally, we plan to address the IoT device deployment 
challenges by developing a method that can determine the most secure deployment of a set of 
IoT devices by using attack graphs.  
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